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Abstract
Decision theory formally solves the problem of
rational agents in uncertain worlds if the true
environmental probability distribution is known.
Solomonoff’s theory of universal induction formally
solves the problem of sequence prediction for
unknown distribution. We unify both theories and
give strong arguments that the resulting universal
AIξ model behaves optimal in any computable
environment. The major drawback of the AIξ
model is that it is uncomputable. To overcome this
problem, we construct a modified algorithm AIξtl,
which is still superior to any other time t and space
l bounded agent. The computation time of AIξtl is
of the order t·2l.
Key Words
Rational agents, sequential decision theory, universal
Solomonoff induction, algorithmic probability, rein-
forcement learning, computational complexity, the-
orem proving, probabilistic reasoning, Kolmogorov
complexity, Levin search.
1 Introduction
The most general framework for Artificial Intelligence is
the picture of an agent interacting with an environment
[RN95]. If the goal is not pre-specified, the agent has
to learn by occasional reinforcement feedback [SB98]. If
the agent shall be universal, no assumption about the en-
vironment may be made, besides that there exists some
exploitable structure at all. We may ask for the most
intelligent way an agent could behave, or, about the op-
timal way of learning in terms of real world interaction
cycles. Decision theory formally1 solves this problem only
1With a formal solution we mean a rigorous mathematically def-
inition, uniquely specifying the solution. For problems considered
here this always implies the existence of an algorithm which asymp-
totically converges to the correct solution.
if the true environmental probability distribution is known
(e.g. Backgammon) [Bel57, BT96]. [Sol64, Sol78] formally
solves the problem of induction if the true distribution is
unknown but only if the agent cannot influence the envi-
ronment (e.g. weather forecasts) [LV97]. We combine both
ideas and get a parameterless model AIξ of an acting agent
which we claim to behave optimally in any computable en-
vironment (e.g. prisoner or auction problems, poker, car
driving). To get an effective solution, a modification AIξtl,
superior to any other time t and space l bounded agent,
is constructed. The computation time of AIξtl is of the
order t ·2l. The main goal of this work is to derive and
discuss the AIξ and the AIξtl model, and to clarify the
meaning of universal, optimal, superior, etc. Details can
be found in [Hut00b].
2 Rational Agents & Sequential
Decisions
Agents in probabilistic environments: A very gen-
eral framework for intelligent systems is that of rational
agents [RN95]. In cycle k, an agent performs action yk∈Y
(output word) which results in a perception xk∈X (input
word), followed by cycle k+1 and so on. If agent and en-
vironment are deterministic and computable, the entan-
glement of both can be modeled by two Turing machines
with two common tapes (and some private tapes) contain-
ing the action stream y1y2y3... and the perception stream
x1x2x3... (The meaning of xk ≡ x
′
krk is explained in the
next paragraph):
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p is the policy of the agent interacting with environ-
ment q. We write p(x<k) = y1:k to denote the output
y1:k≡ y1...yk of the agent p on input x<k≡x1...xk−1 and
similarly q(y1:k) = x1:k for the environment q. We call
Turing machines p and q behaving in this way chronolog-
ical. In the more general case of a probabilistic environ-
ment, given the history yx<kyk ≡ y1x1...yk−1xk−1yk, the
probability that the environment leads to perception xk in
cycle k is (by definition) µ(yx<kyxk). The underlined argu-
ment xk in µ is a probability variable and the other non-
underlined arguments yx<kyk represent conditions. We
call probability distributions like µ chronological.
The AIµ Model: The goal of the agent is to maximize
future rewards, which are provided by the environment
through the inputs xk. The inputs xk ≡x
′
krk are divided
into a regular part x′k and some (possibly empty or de-
layed) reward rk. The µ-expected reward sum of future
cycles k to m with outputs yk:m= y
p
k:m generated by the
agent’s policy p can be written compactly as
V pµ (y˙x˙<k) :=
∑
xk...xm
(rk+ ...+rm)µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:m), (1)
where m is the lifespan of the agent, and the dots above
y˙x˙<k indicate the actual action and perception history.
The µ-expected reward sum of future cycles k to m with
outputs yi generated by the ideal agent, which maximizes
the expected future rewards is
V ∗µ (y˙x˙<k) := max
yk
∑
xk
...max
ym
∑
xm
(rk+ ...+rm)µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:m),
(2)
i.e. the best expected credit is obtained by averaging over
the xi and maximizing over the yi. This has to be done
in chronological order to correctly incorporate the depen-
dency of xi and yi on the history. The output y˙k, which
achieves the maximal value defines the AIµ model:
y˙k := maxarg
yk
∑
xk
...max
ym
∑
xm
(rk+...+rm)µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:m). (3)
The AIµ model is optimal in the sense that no other policy
leads to higher µ-expected reward. A detailed derivation
and other recursive and functional versions can be found
in [Hut00b].
Sequential decision theory: Eq. (3) is essentially an
Expectimax algorithm/sequence. One can relate (3) to
the Bellman equations [Bel57] of sequential decision the-
ory by identifying complete histories yx<k with states,
µ(yx<kyxk) with the state transition matrix, V
∗
µ (yx<k)
with the value of history/state yx<k, and yk with the ac-
tion in cycle k [RN95, Hut00b]. Due to the use of complete
histories as state space, the AIµ model neither assumes
stationarity, nor the Markov property, nor complete ac-
cessibility of the environment. Every state occurs at most
once in the lifetime of the system. As we have in mind
a universal system with complex interactions, the action
and perception spaces Y and X are huge (e.g. video im-
ages), and every action or perception itself occurs usually
only once in the lifespan m of the agent. As there is no
(obvious) universal similarity relation on the state space,
an effective reduction of its size is impossible, but there
is no principle problem in determining y˙k as long as µ is
known and computable and X , Y and m are finite.
Reinforcement learning: Things dramatically change
if µ is unknown. Reinforcement learning algorithms
[LK96, SB98, BT96] are commonly used in this case to
learn the unknown µ. They succeed if the state space is
either small or has effectively been made small by gen-
eralization or function approximation techniques. In any
case, the solutions are either ad hoc, work in restricted
domains only, have serious problems with state space ex-
ploration versus exploitation, or have non-optimal learning
rate. There is no universal and optimal solution to this
problem so far. In the Section 4 we present a new model
and argue that it formally solves all these problems in an
optimal way. The true probability distribution µ will not
be learned directly, but will be replaced by a universal
prior ξ, which is shown to converge to µ in a sense.
3 Algorithmic Complexity and
Universal Induction
The problem of the unknown environment: We
have argued that currently there is no universal and op-
timal solution to solving reinforcement learning problems.
On the other hand, [Sol64] defined a universal scheme of
inductive inference, based on Epicurus’ principle of mul-
tiple explanations, Ockham’s razor, and Bayes’ rule for
conditional probabilities. For an excellent introduction
one should consult the book of [LV97]. In the following
we outline the theory and the basic results.
Kolmogorov complexity and universal probabil-
ity: Let us choose some universal prefix Turing ma-
chine U with unidirectional binary input and output
tapes and a bidirectional working tape. We can then
define the (conditional) prefix Kolmogorov complexity
[Cha75, G7´4, Kol65, Lev74] as the length l of the shortest
program p, for which U outputs the binary string x=x1:n
with xi ∈{0, 1}:
K(x) := min
p
{l(p) : U(p) = x},
2
and given y
K(x|y) := min
p
{l(p) : U(p, y) = x}.
The universal semimeasure ξ(x) is defined as the proba-
bility that the output of U starts with x when provided
with fair coin flips on the input tape [Sol64, Sol78]. It is
easy to see that this is equivalent to the formal definition
ξ(x) :=
∑
p : ∃ω:U(p)=xω
2−l(p) (4)
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U out-
puts a string starting with x. U might be non-terminating.
As the short programs dominate the sum, ξ is closely re-
lated toK(x) as ξ(x) = 2−K(x)+O(K(l(x)). ξ has the impor-
tant universality property [Sol64] that it dominates every
computable probability distribution ρ up to a multiplica-
tive factor depending only on ρ but not on x:
ξ(x) ≥ 2−K(ρ)−O(1) ·ρ(x). (5)
The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like ρ is defined
as the length of the shortest self-delimiting coding of a
Turing machine computing this function. ξ itself is not
a probability distribution2. We have ξ(x0)+ξ(x1)<ξ(x)
because there are programs p, which output just x, nei-
ther followed by 0 nor 1. They just stop after printing x
or continue forever without any further output. We will
call a function ρ ≥ 0 with the properties ρ(ǫ) ≤ 1 and∑
xn
ρ(x1:n)≤ρ(x<n) a semimeasure. ξ is a semimeasure
and (5) actually holds for all enumerable semimeasures ρ.
Universal sequence prediction: (Binary) sequence
prediction algorithms try to predict the continuation xn
of a given sequence x1...xn−1. In the following we will as-
sume that the sequences are drawn from a probability dis-
tribution and that the true probability of a string starting
with x1...xn is µ(x1:n). The probability of xn given x<n
hence is µ(x<nxn). If we measure prediction quality as
the number of correct predictions, the best possible sys-
tem predicts the xn with the highest probability. Usually
µ is unknown and the system can only have some belief ρ
about the true distribution µ. Now the universal proba-
bility ξ comes into play: [Sol78] has proved that the mean
squared difference between ξ and µ is finite for computable
µ:
∞∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(x<k)(ξ(x<kxk)− µ(x<kxk))
2 (6)
< ln 2·K(µ) +O(1).
2It is possible to normalize ξ to a probability distribution as has
been done in [Sol78, Hut99] by giving up the enumerability of ξ.
Bounds (6) and (8) hold for both definitions.
A simplified proof can be found in [Hut99]. So the differ-
ence between ξ(x<nxn) and µ(x<nxn) tends to zero with
µ probability 1 for any computable probability distribu-
tion µ. The reason for the astonishing property of a single
(universal) function to converge to any computable proba-
bility distribution lies in the fact that the set of µ-random
sequences differ for different µ. The universality property
(5) is the central ingredient for proving (6).
Error bounds: Let SPρ be a probabilistic sequence pre-
dictor, predicting xn with probability ρ(x<nxn). If ρ
is only a semimeasure the SPρ system might refuse any
output in some cycles n. Further, we define a deter-
ministic sequence predictor SPΘρ predicting the xn with
highest ρ probability. Θρ(x<nxn) := 1 for one xn with
ρ(x<nxn)≥ ρ(x<nx
′
n)∀x
′
n and Θρ(x<nxn) := 0 otherwise.
SPΘµ is the best prediction scheme when µ is known. If
ρ(x<nxn) converges quickly to µ(x<nxn) the number of
additional prediction errors introduced by using Θρ in-
stead of Θµ for prediction should be small in some sense.
Let us define the total number of expected erroneous pre-
dictions the SPρ system makes for the first n bits:
Enρ :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(x1:k)(1−ρ(x<kxk)). (7)
The SPΘµ system is best in the sense that EnΘµ ≤ Enρ
for any ρ. In [Hut99] it has been shown that SPΘξ is not
much worse
EnΘξ−Enρ ≤ H +
√
4EnρH +H2 = O(
√
Enρ) (8)
with H < ln 2·K(µ) +O(1)
and the tightest bound for ρ=Θµ. For finite E∞Θµ , E∞Θξ
is finite too. For infinite E∞Θµ , EnΘξ/EnΘµ
n→∞
−→ 1 with
rapid convergence. One can hardly imagine any better
prediction algorithm as SPΘξ without extra knowledge
about the environment. In [Hut00a], (6) and (8) have
been generalized from binary to arbitrary alphabet and
to general loss functions. Apart from computational as-
pects, which are of course very important, the problem of
sequence prediction could be viewed as essentially solved.
4 The Universal AIξ Model
Definition of the AIξ Model: We have developed
enough formalism to suggest our universal AIξ model.
All we have to do is to suitably generalize the universal
semimeasure ξ from the last section and to replace the
true but unknown probability µ in the AIµ model by this
generalized ξ. In what sense this AIξ model is universal
and optimal will be discussed thereafter.
We define the generalized universal probability ξAI as
the 2−l(q) weighted sum over all chronological programs
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(environments) q which output x1:k, similar to (4) but
with y1:k provided on the ”input” tape:
ξ(yx1:k) :=
∑
q:q(y1:k)=x1:k
2−l(q). (9)
Replacing µ by ξ in (3) the iterative AIξ system outputs
y˙k := maxarg
yk
∑
xk
...max
ym
∑
xm
(ck+ ...+cm)ξ(y˙x˙<kyxk:m).
(10)
in cycle k given the history y˙x˙<k.
(Non)parameters of AIξ: The AIξ model and its be-
haviour is completely defined by (9) and (10). It (slightly)
depends on the choice of the universal Turing machine.
The AIξ model also depends on the choice of X and Y ,
but we do not expect any bias when the spaces are chosen
sufficiently large and simple, e.g. all strings of length 216.
Choosing IN as word space would be ideal, but whether
the maxima (or suprema) exist in this case, has to be
shown beforehand. The only non-trivial dependence is on
the horizon m. Ideally we would like to chose m=∞, but
there are several subtleties to be discussed later, which
prevent at least a naive limit m → ∞. So apart from
m and unimportant details, the AIξ system is uniquely
defined by (10) and (9) without adjustable parameters.
It does not depend on any assumption about the envi-
ronment apart from being generated by some computable
(but unknown!) probability distribution as we will see.
ξ is only a semimeasure: One subtlety should be men-
tioned. Like in the SP case, ξ is not a probability distri-
bution but still satisfies the weaker inequalities
∑
xn
ξ(yx1:n) ≤ ξ(yx<n) , ξ(ǫ) ≤ 1 (11)
Note, that the sum on the l.h.s. is not independent of
yn unlike for the chronological probability distribution
µ. Nevertheless, it is bounded by something (the r.h.s)
which is independent of yn. The reason is that the sum
in (9) runs over (partial recursive) chronological functions
only and the functions q which satisfy q(y1:n) = x<nx
′
n
for some x′n ∈ X are a subset of the functions satisfying
q(y<n) = x<n. We will in general call functions satisfying
(11) chronological semimeasures. The important point is
that the conditional probabilities (9) are ≤1 like for true
probability distributions.
Universality of ξAI : It can be shown that ξAI defined
in (9) is universal and converges to µAI analogously to
the SP case (5) and (6). The proofs are generalizations
from the SP case. The actions y are pure spectators and
cause no difficulties in the generalization. This will change
when we analyze error/value bounds analogously to (8).
The major difference when incorporating y is that in (5),
U(p) = xω produces strings starting with x, whereas in
(9) we can demand q to output exactly n words x1:n as
q knows n from the number of input words y1...yn. ξ
AI
dominates all chronological enumerable semimeasures
ξ(yx1:n) ≥ 2
−K(ρ)−O(1)ρ(yx1:n). (12)
ξ is a universal element in the sense of (12) in the set of
all enumerable chronological semimeasures. This can be
proved even for infinite (countable) alphabet [Hut00b].
Convergence of ξAI to µAI : From (12) one can show
n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(yx<k)
(
µ(yx<kyxk)− ξ(yx<kyxk)
)2
< ln 2·K(µ) +O(1) (13)
for computable chronological measures µ. The main com-
plication in generalizing (6) to (13) is the generalization
to non-binary alphabet [Hut00a]. The y are, again, pure
spectators. (13) shows that the µ-expected squared differ-
ence of µ and ξ is finite for computable µ. This, in turn,
shows that ξ(yx<kyxk) converges to µ(yx<kyxk) for k→∞
with µ probability 1. If we take a finite product of ξ′s and
use Bayes’ rule, we see that also ξ(yx<kyxk:k+r) converges
to µ(yx<kyxk:k+r). More generally, in case of a bounded
horizon hk ≡ mk−k+1 ≤ hmax<∞, it follows that
ξ(yx<kyxk:mk)
k→∞
−→ µ(yx<kyxk:mk) (14)
Convergence is only guaranteed for one (e.g. the true)
i/o sequence y˙x˙<ky˙x˙k:mk but not for alternate sequences
y˙x˙<kyxk:mk . Since (10) takes an average over all possible
future actions and perceptions yxk:mk ; not only the one
which will finally occur, (14) does not guarantee y˙ξk→ y˙
µ
k .
This gap is already present in the SPΘρ models, but nev-
ertheless good error bounds could be proved. This gives
confidence that the outputs y˙k of the AIξ model (10) could
converge to the outputs y˙k of the AIµ model (3), at least
for a bounded horizon hk. The problems with a fixed hori-
zon mk=m and especially m→∞ will be discussed later.
Universally optimal AI systems: We want to call
an AI model universal, if it is µ-independent (unbiased,
model-free) and is able to solve any solvable problem and
learn any learnable task. Further, we call a universal
model, universally optimal, if there is no program, which
can solve or learn significantly faster (in terms of interac-
tion cycles). As the AIξ model is parameterless, ξ con-
verges to µ in the sense of (13,14), the AIµ model is itself
optimal, and we expect no other model to converge faster
to AIµ by analogy to SP (8),
we expect AIξ to be universally optimal.
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This is our main claim. Further support is given in
[Hut00b] by a detailed analysis of the behaviour of AIξ for
various problem classes, including prediction, optimiza-
tion, games, and supervised learning.
The choice of the horizon: The only significant arbi-
trariness in the AIξ model lies in the choice of the lifespan
m or the hk≡mk−k+1 if we allow a cycle dependent m.
We will not discuss ad hoc choices of hk for specific prob-
lems. We are interested in universal choices. The book of
[Ber95] thoroughly discusses the mathematical problems
regarding infinite horizon systems.
In many cases the time we are willing to run a system
depends on the quality of its actions. Hence, the lifetime,
if finite at all, is not known in advance. Exponential dis-
counting rk→ rk ·γ
k solves the mathematical problem of
m → ∞ but is no real solution, since an effective hori-
zon h ∼ ln 1
γ
has been introduced. The scale invariant
discounting rk → rk ·k
−α has a dynamic horizon h ∼ k.
This choice has some appeal, as it seems that humans of
age k years usually do not plan their lives for more than
the next ∼ k years. From a practical point of view this
model might serve all needs, but from a theoretical point
we feel uncomfortable with such a limitation in the hori-
zon from the very beginning. A possible way of taking the
limit m→∞ without discounting and its problems can be
found in [Hut00b].
Another objection against too large choices of mk is
that ξ(yx<kyxk:mk) has been proved to be a good approx-
imation of µ(yx<kyxk:mk) only for k≫hk, which is never
satisfied for mk = m → ∞. On the other hand it may
turn out that the rewards rk′ for k
′≫k, where ξ may no
longer be trusted as a good approximation of µ, are in a
sense randomly disturbed with decreasing influence on the
choice of y˙k. This claim is supported by the forgetfulness
property of ξ (see next section)and can be proved when
restricting to factorizable environments [Hut00b].
We are not sure whether the choice of mk is of marginal
importance, as long as mk is chosen sufficiently large and
of low complexity, mk = 2
216 for instance, or whether
the choice of mk will turn out to be a central topic for
the AIξ model or for the planning aspect of any universal
AI system in general. Most if not all problems in agent
design of balancing exploration and exploitation vanish by
a sufficiently large choice of the (effective) horizon and/or
a sufficiently general prior. We suppose that the limit
mk→∞ for the AIξ model results in correct behaviour for
weakly separable (defined in the next section) µ, and that
even the naive limit m→∞ may exist.
Value bounds and separability concepts: The val-
ues V ∗ρ associated with the AIρ systems correspond
roughly to the negative error measure −Enρ of the SPρ
systems. In the SP case we were interested in small bounds
for the error excess EnΘξ −Enρ. Unfortunately, simple
value bounds for AIξ or any other AI system in terms of V ∗
analogously to the error bound (8) can not hold [Hut00b].
We even have difficulties in specifying what we can expect
to hold for AIξ or any AI system which claims to be uni-
versally optimal. In SP, the only important property of µ
for proving error bounds was its complexity K(µ). In the
AI case, there are no useful bounds in terms of K(µ) only.
We either have to study restricted problem classes or con-
sider bounds depending on other properties of µ, rather
than on its complexity only. In [Hut00b] the difficulties
are exhibited by two examples. Several concepts, which
might be useful for proving value bounds are introduced
and discussed. They include forgetful, relevant, asymptot-
ically learnable, farsighted, uniform, (generalized) Marko-
vian, factorizable and (pseudo) passive µ. They are ap-
proximately sorted in the order of decreasing generality
and are called separability concepts. A first weak bound
for passive µ is proved.
5 Time Bounds and Effectiveness
Non-effectiveness of AIξ: ξ is not a computable but
only an enumerable semimeasure. Hence, the output y˙k
of the AIξ model is only asymptotically computable. AIξ
yields an algorithm that produces a sequence of trial out-
puts eventually converging to the correct output y˙k, but
one can never be sure whether one has already reached it.
Besides this, convergence is extremely slow, so this type
of asymptotic computability is of no direct (practical) use.
Furthermore, the replacement of ξ by time-limited versions
[LV91, LV97], which is suitable for sequence prediction,
has been shown to fail for the AIξ model [Hut00b]. This
leads to the issues addressed next.
Time bounds and effectiveness: Let p˜ be a policy
which calculates an acceptable output within a reason-
able time t˜ per cycle. This sort of computability assump-
tion, namely, that a general purpose computer of sufficient
power and appropriate program is able to behave in an in-
telligent way, is the very basis of AI research. Here it is
not necessary to discuss what exactly is meant by ’reason-
able time/intelligence’ and ’sufficient power’. What we
are interested in is whether there is a computable version
AIξt˜ of the AIξ system which is superior or equal to any
program p with computation time per cycle of at most t˜.
What one can realistically hope to construct is an AIξt˜l˜
system of computation time c·˜t per cycle for some constant
c. The idea is to run all programs p of length ≤ l˜ := l(p˜)
and time ≤ t˜ per cycle and pick the best output in the
sense of maximizing the universal value V ∗ξ . The total
computation time is c · t˜ with c ≈ 2l˜. Unfortunately V ∗ξ
can not be used directly since this measure is also only
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semi-computable and the approximation quality by using
computable versions of ξ given a time of order c·t˜ is crude
[LV97, Hut00b]. On the other hand, we have to use a
measure which converges V ∗ξ for t˜, l˜→∞, since the AIξ
t˜l˜
model should converge to the AIξ model in that case.
Valid approximations: A solution satisfying the above
conditions is suggested in [Hut00b]. The main idea is
to consider extended chronological incremental policies p,
which in addition to the regular output ypk rate their own
output with wpk. The AIξ
t˜l˜ model selects the output
y˙k = y
p
k of the policy p with highest rating w
p
k. p might
suggest any output ypk but it is not allowed to rate itself
with an arbitrarily high wpk if one wants w
p
k to be a reliable
criterion for selecting the best p. One must demand that
no policy p is allowed to claim that it is better than it
actually is. In [Hut00b] a (logical) predicate VA(p), called
valid approximation, is defined, which is true if, and only
if, p always satisfies wpk ≤ V
p
ξ (yx<k), i.e. never overrates
itself. V pξ (yx<k) is the ξ expected future reward under
policy p. Valid policies p can then be (partially) ordered
w.r.t. their rating wpk.
The universal time bounded AIξt˜l˜ system: In the
following, we describe the algorithm p∗ underlying the uni-
versal time bounded AIξt˜l˜ system. It is essentially based
on the selection of the best algorithms p∗k out of the time
t˜ and length l˜ bounded policies p, for which there exists a
proof P of VA(p) with length ≤ lP .
1. Create all binary strings of length lP and interpret
each as a coding of a mathematical proof in the same
formal logic system in which VA(·) has been formu-
lated. Take those strings which are proofs of VA(p)
for some p and keep the corresponding programs p.
2. Eliminate all p of length >l˜.
3. Modify all p in the following way: all output wpky
p
k is
temporarily written on an auxiliary tape. If p stops
in t˜ steps the internal ’output’ is copied to the output
tape. If p does not stop after t˜ steps a stop is forced
and wpk = 0 and some arbitrary y
p
k is written on the
output tape. Let P be the set of all those modified
programs.
4. Start first cycle: k :=1.
5. Run every p ∈ P on extended input y˙x˙<k, where
all outputs are redirected to some auxiliary tape:
p(y˙x˙<k) = w
p
1y
p
1 ...w
p
ky
p
k. This step is performed in-
crementally by adding y˙x˙k−1 for k > 1 to the input
tape and continuing the computation of the previous
cycle.
6. Select the program p with highest rating wpk: p
∗
k :=
maxargp w
p
k.
7. Write y˙k :=y
p∗k
k to the output tape.
8. Receive input x˙k from the environment.
9. Begin next cycle: k :=k+1, goto step 5.
Properties of the p∗ algorithm: Let p be any ex-
tended chronological (incremental) policy of length l(p)≤ l˜
and computation time per cycle t(p)≤ t˜, for which there
exists a proof of VA(p) of length ≤ lP . The algorithm
p∗, depending on l˜, t˜ and lP but not on p, has always
higher rating than any such p. The setup time of p∗ is
tsetup(p
∗) =O(l2P ·2
lP ) and the computation time per cy-
cle is tcycle(p
∗) = O(2l˜ · t˜). Furthermore, for t˜, l˜→∞, p∗
converges to the behavior of the AIξ model.
Roughly speaking, this means that if there exists a com-
putable solution to some AI problem at all, then the ex-
plicitly constructed algorithm p∗ is such a solution. Al-
though this claim is quite general, there are some limi-
tations and open questions, regarding the setup time re-
garding the necessity that the policies must rate their own
output, regarding true but not efficiently provable VA(p),
and regarding “inconsistent” policies [Hut00b].
6 Outlook & Discussion
This section contains some discussion and remarks on oth-
erwise unmentioned topics.
Value bounds: Rigorous proofs of value bounds for the
AIξ theory are the major theoretical challenge – general
ones as well as tighter bounds for special environments
µ. Of special importance are suitable (and acceptable)
conditions to µ, under which y˙k and finite value bounds
exist for infinite Y , X and m.
Scaling AIξ down: [Hut00b] shows for several exam-
ples how to integrate problem classes into the AIξ model.
Conversely, one can downscale the AIξ model by using
more restricted forms of ξ. This could be done in a similar
way as the theory of universal induction has been down-
scaled with many insights to the Minimum Description
Length principle [LV92, Ris89] or to the domain of finite
automata [FMG92]. The AIξ model might similarly serve
as a super model or as the very definition of (universal un-
biased) intelligence, from which specialized models could
be derived.
Applications: [Hut00b] shows how a number of AI
problem classes, including sequence prediction, strategic
games, function minimization and supervised learning fit
into the general AIξ model. All problems are claimed to
be formally solved by the AIξ model. The solution is, how-
ever, only formal, because the AIξ model is uncomputable
or, at best, approximable. First, each problem class is for-
mulated in its natural way (when µproblem is known) and
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then a formulation within the AIµ model is constructed
and their equivalence is proven. Then, the consequences
of replacing µ by ξ are considered. The main goal is to
understand how the problems are solved by AIξ. For more
details see [Hut00b].
Implementation and approximation: The AIξt˜l˜
model suffers from the same large factor 2l˜ in computation
time as Levin search for inversion problems [Lev73, Lev84].
Nevertheless, Levin search has been implemented and suc-
cessfully applied to a variety of problems [Sch97, SZW97].
Hence, a direct implementation of the AIξt˜l˜ model may
also be successful, at least in toy environments, e.g. pris-
oner problems. The AIξt˜l˜ algorithm should be regarded
only as the first step toward a computable universal AI
model. Elimination of the factor 2l˜ without giving up
universality will probably be a very difficult task. One
could try to select programs p and prove VA(p) in a more
clever way than by mere enumeration. All kinds of ideas
like, heuristic search, genetic algorithms, advanced theo-
rem provers, and many more could be incorporated. But
now we have a problem.
Computability: We seem to have transferred the AI
problem just to a different level. This shift has some
advantages (and also some disadvantages) but presents,
in no way, a solution. Nevertheless, we want to stress
that we have reduced the AI problem to (mere) compu-
tational questions. Even the most general other systems
the author is aware of, depend on some (more than com-
plexity) assumptions about the environment, or it is far
from clear whether they are, indeed, universally optimal.
Although computational questions are themselves highly
complicated, this reduction is a non-trivial result. A for-
mal theory of something, even if not computable, is often
a great step toward solving a problem and has also merits
of its own (see previous paragraphs).
Elegance: Many researchers in AI believe that intelli-
gence is something complicated and cannot be condensed
into a few formulas. They believe it is more a combin-
ing of enough methods and much explicit knowledge in the
right way. From a theoretical point of view, we disagree
as the AIξ model is simple and seems to serve all needs.
From a practical point of view we agree to the following ex-
tent. To reduce the computational burden one should pro-
vide special purpose algorithms (methods) from the very
beginning, probably many of them related to reduce the
complexity of the input and output spaces X and Y by
appropriate pre/post-processing methods.
Extra knowledge: There is no need to incorporate ex-
tra knowledge from the very beginning. It can be presented
in the first few cycles in any format. As long as the al-
gorithm that interprets the data is of size O(1), the AIξ
system will ’understand’ the data after a few cycles (see
[Hut00b]). If the environment µ is complicated but extra
knowledge z makes K(µ|z) small, one can show that the
bound (13) reduces to ln 2·K(µ|z) when x1≡z, i.e. when z
is presented in the first cycle. Special purpose algorithms
could also be presented in x1, but it would be cheating to
say that no special purpose algorithms have been imple-
mented in AIξ. The boundary between implementation
and training is blurred in the AIξ model.
Training: We have not said much about the training
process itself, as it is not specific to the AIξ model and
has been discussed in literature in various forms and dis-
ciplines. A serious discussion would be out of place. To re-
peat a truism, it is, of course, important to present enough
knowledge x′k and evaluate the system output yk with rk
in a reasonable way. To maximize the information con-
tent in the reward, one should start with simple tasks and
give positive reward to approximately the better half of
the outputs yk, for instance.
The big questions: [Hut00b] contains a discussion of
the “big” questions concerning the mere existence of any
computable, fast, and elegant universal theory of intelli-
gence, related to non-computable µ [Pen94] and the ‘num-
ber of wisdom’ Ω [Cha75, Cha91].
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